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RESUMO: A democracia deliberativa contém uma teoria da legitimidade. Uma das suas 
versões é o procedimentalismo puro, segundo o qual os princípios que estabelecem os 
termos da cooperação política em sistemas deliberativos devem conter sobretudo o 
processo de deliberação e nenhuns outros elementos substantivos, salvo se estes forem 
necessários para assegurar que o processo seja equitativo. Este artigo mostra que o 
procedimentalismo puro sujeita-se ao “problema dos pré-requisitos”: mesmo que o 
procedimentalismo puro seja um critério de legitimidade, a legitimidade do 
procedimentalismo puro enquanto fonte de legitimidade subsequente não pode basear-se 
em procedimentos deliberativos. O problema contém dois argumentos: o argumento do 
pré-requisito da pertença procedimental (o estabelecimento de direitos de pertença aos 
procedimentos deve estar imune à deliberação); e o argumento do pré-requisito do 
governo procedimental (a regra estabelecendo o limiar quantitativo a partir do qual uma 
decisão é atingida deve estar imune à deliberação).
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ABSTRACT: Deliberative democracy contains a theory of legitimacy. One of its 
versions is pure proceduralism, according to which the principles establishing terms of 
political cooperation in deliberative systems should inform mainly the process of 
deliberation and no additional substantive elements, except to the extent that they are 
necessary for a fair process. This paper shows that pure proceduralism faces the ‘problem 
of prerequisites’. It consists in the fact that, even if pure proceduralism may be a criterion 
of legitimacy, the legitimacy of pure proceduralism as a source of subsequent legitimacy
is not grounded in deliberative procedures. The problem comprises two arguments: the 
argument from the prerequisite of procedural membership (the establishment of 
membership rights to procedures must be immune to deliberation); and the argument from 
the prerequisite of procedural ruling (the rule establishing the quantitative threshold from 
which a decision is reached must be immune to deliberation).
Keywords: Deliberative Democracy; Legitimacy; Membership; Prerequisites; Pure 
Proceduralism;
eliberative democracy contains a theory of legitimacy, especially when it 
comes to accounting for the justification of authority in a democracy. One 
of its most notorious versions is pure proceduralism, which claims that the principles 
establishing terms of political cooperation in deliberative systems should inform chiefly 
the process of actual deliberation and no additional substantive elements, except only to 
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the extent that they are necessary for an effective and fair process to occur. The following 
arguments will try to show that pure proceduralist theories of political legitimacy face the 
challenge that is to be called ‘the problem of prerequisites’. It consists in the fact that, 
even if pure proceduralism may be a criterion of legitimacy, the legitimacy of pure 
proceduralism as a source of subsequent legitimacy is not grounded in deliberative 
procedures. 
The paper comprises four sections. The first will present a standard 
characterization of proceduralism with regard to democratic legitimacy, with a special 
emphasis on the nature of pure proceduralism. The second will establish three criteria 
without which there can be no viable proceduralist theory of legitimacy: action; individual 
membership; and quantitative decision ruling.
The remaining sections will present two arguments that constitute the problem of 
prerequisites. The first is the argument from the prerequisite of procedural membership, 
according to which participation in a decision-making procedure cannot be established 
by the procedure since it will always have to trace the source of its legitimacy to a prior 
rule (immune to deliberation) conferring membership rights; otherwise, the procedural 
deliberation establishing membership criteria would have the same problem of identifying 
the rule conferring membership rights to such a deliberative procedure, which in turn 
would also have the same problem, and so on. The second is the argument from the 
prerequisite of procedural ruling, according to which the definitive threshold creating a 
decision cannot be established by a deliberative procedure since it does not permit the 
possibility of theoretical disagreement about its nature and contents; otherwise, the 
inexistence of unanimous consensus about decision rules would require the application 
of a prior decision rule in order to explain the decision rules in force, which in turn would 
have the same problem, and so on.
The point of the arguments is to underline the fact that the problem of prerequisites 
undermines the potential of pure proceduralist theories to become self-sufficient theories 
of political legitimacy, insofar as procedures are not the source of legitimacy per se but 
rather the instruments for assessing and actualizing prior sources of legitimacy.
THE STANDARD CHARACTERIZATION OF PROCEDURALISM
Deliberative democracy emphasizes rational dialogue and consensus formation 
among individuals. By definition, it is very demanding. Many of those demands are 
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institutional, involving rules, procedures, and resources that support, condition and 
require nearly-universal discussion and greatly constrain whether and how group-
formation occurs and collective decisions emerge. Their purpose is to establish effective 
means of decision making through a set of legitimacy principles that make up the core of 
deliberative democracy. Ultimately, deliberative democracy is not simply a form of 
democracy in which deliberation is central to decision making; it is also a frame of 
reference to political legitimacy in democratic experiences.
The demanding requirements of deliberation can be substantive morally-charged 
determinants, such as sameness and equality, or mere procedural conditions of equal 
participation. 
Proceduralist versions of deliberative democracy claim that the principles 
establishing terms of political cooperation in deliberative systems should inform mainly 
the process of actual deliberation. The standard account of proceduralism has its origins 
in John Rawls’ distinction between perfect, imperfect and pure proceduralism (Rawls 
1971, pp. 85-86). Perfect and imperfect versions of proceduralism state that the property
qualifying outcomes as legitimate is established before the construction and application 
of the procedures – if procedures are capable of leading to the desired outcome with 
certainty, they are ‘perfect’; if there is no guarantee that certain procedures will reach a 
legitimate outcome, they are ‘imperfect’. In pure proceduralism, however, the qualities 
of the outcome cannot be known before a legitimate procedure is actually carried out; 
procedures have a central role in the articulation of a concept of legitimacy as they are 
capable, if correctly carried out, of transferring their properties to their outcomes – the 
legitimacy of outcomes depends entirely on the legitimacy of procedures leading to them.
In the case of imperfect proceduralism – which Peter (2008) calls ‘rational 
proceduralism’ – mere procedures cannot justify outcomes that are unjust according to 
substantive principles. These versions of proceduralism assume that there is often a 
combination of conditions that refer to the quality of outcomes of decision making with 
conditions that apply to procedural features (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; 2004, pp. 
96-138). According to this version, the justification of decisions is paramount to 
democratic legitimacy; public deliberation must somehow lead to a decision that all those 
affected can endorse, or at least that no one can reject with good reasons. Political 
legitimacy, thus, focuses not only on the conditions under which a decision is reached, 
but also on the rational quality of the outcomes chosen. The structure of this kind of 
deliberative democracy includes an independently defined desirable outcome – a decision 
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everyone has reasons to endorse – that is brought about by a particular procedure. An 
ideally fair deliberative process is necessary and sufficient to generate a rationally 
justified political decision. This conception can be found, for instance, in Cohen (1989, 
pp. 17-34), Benhabib (1994), and in Postema (1995). It also constitutes the grounds for 
epistemic defences of democracy, often known as ‘epistemic proceduralism’ (Estlund 
2008, p. 98).
According to pure proceduralism, however, legitimacy is ensured as long as the 
requirements of procedural fairness are satisfied; outcomes as such do not matter; what is 
important is that collective decision making proceeds through public deliberation between 
all those affected under some conditions of political fairness or equality. Decisions are 
legitimate as long as they are the result of an appropriately constrained process of 
democratic decision making. By assuming that the deliberative process tends to produce 
disagreements which can hardly be reconciled, pure proceduralism considers that there is 
no other justification for a particular decision other than it being the result of a fair process 
– the legitimacy of the outcomes only depends on the fairness of the decision-making 
process and not necessarily on the quality of the outcomes it produces. This view can be 
found in authors such as Christiano (1996, p. 36), Gaus (1997, pp. 205-242), Young 
(1993, p. 130), and Sunstein (1999, pp. 147–148).1
Limiting our focus to deliberative democracy (whether epistemic or not), the 
following argument will try to show that pure proceduralist theories of legitimacy face a 
potential death blow in the ‘the problem of prerequisites’. There are at least two 
methodological prerequisites to any deliberative procedure without which there can be no 
(fair or unfair) procedure at all; both prerequisites legitimize procedures without being 
subject to a deliberative procedure. Even though pure proceduralism intends to be a 
criterion of legitimacy, the legitimacy of proceduralism as a source of subsequent 
legitimacy is grounded on prerequisites that are immune to proceduralism. In order to 
illustrate this point, the argument will have to present firstly the three criteria of 
participation in deliberative processes: action; individual membership; and quantitative 
decision ruling. The relations between these elements will comprise the problem of 
prerequisites. 
                                                          
1 Even though they are scarce, there are also epistemic accounts of deliberative democracy that can be 
qualified as pure proceduralist. Pure epistemic proceduralism rejects the idea that a procedure-independent 
standard for the correctness of political decisions can provide a normative yardstick for legitimacy; rather, 
it incorporates epistemic values in procedural fashion by making the epistemic value of deliberative 
decision making depend on its procedural features (on how inclusive it is, for instance) (Peter 2013). 
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THE THREE CRITERIA OF PARTICIPATION IN DELIBERATIVE 
PROCESSES
Participation in deliberative processes includes at least three criteria without 
which it cannot be conceived. 
(1) Action. Democratic participation occurs inside a dynamic procedure in which 
a certain activity takes place that aims at bringing about something new. This 
requires an action, an agent and a final result to be produced. The action is the 
individual instance in the series of a reason-giving process; the agent is each and 
every individual participant; and the final result to be produced is a specific 
(definitive or provisional) political decision (the reason-giving process leads to a 
decision that is to be enforced for some period of time; participants do not 
deliberate just for the sake of deliberation or for individual enlightenment).2
(2) Individual membership. The term participation entails literally that the action 
is performed by the parts rather than the whole. In fact, what sets the whole in 
motion seems to be the prior motions of those entities that are not only covered by 
the conceptual framework of the whole, but that actually compose the whole. And 
in deliberative democracy, the whole is composed of individuals rather than 
groups.
(3) Quantitative decision rule. Even though the production of a result is expressed 
through unity (the decision-making process aims at producing one decision that 
can be imputed to one political whole), the actions of individual members are 
plural. Hence, there must be a methodological way of connecting the category of
plurality with the category of unity, that is, of transforming a mere coexistence of 
individual and isolated actions by different agents into an actual collective 
decision. This operation consists mainly in the mathematical procedure of adding 
a plurality of units into an overall larger unit. In deliberative democracy, 
deliberation aims at achieving consensus, that is, at finding reasons acceptable to 
                                                          
2 Simple passive acquiescence with established decisions can be called participation in democracy, but it 
fails to produce a deliberative democracy. The existence of the latter depends upon individual actions by 
participants in decision-making processes. A participant in a deliberative democracy must necessarily be 
what Thomas Jefferson called a ‘participator in the government of affairs’ (Jefferson 1944, p. 661).
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all who are committed to such a system of decision making. However, since 
actions are not always the same between individuals, majoritarian decision 
making applies when consensus is not possible. If the addition that produces the 
end result does not achieve unanimity, that is, the absolute coincidence between 
the total sum of the parts’ actions and the whole’s political decision, what emerges 
is a majoritarian outcome. Participation involves thus a quantitative decision rule 
(that is, a rule establishing the level of agreement necessary to finalize a decision)
expressing unanimous consensus or majoritarian settings as a procedural way of 
achieving the desired outcome.
These criteria3 are not instantaneous. The fact that two of the criteria are met does 
not necessarily imply that the third must be met also, whatever the order in which they 
appear. For instance, from the fact that there is an active decision-making process in play 
producing a given result by means of a quantitative decision rule does not necessarily 
imply full membership to the political community in which those decisions are taking 
place.4 Also, the fact that individual members of a political community are acting in a 
decision-making process does not necessarily imply that the outcomes of such processes 
are inferred by means of a democratically-supported decision rule.5
Consequently, these criteria cannot be determined inside the democratic process 
itself; rather, each one of them must be presupposed before the actual deliberative process 
begins. The connection between them denotes that there are at least two prerequisites in 
deliberative democracy that cannot be ascertained by means of democratic participation 
at all. In other words, procedures determining specific political decisions can be sources 
of legitimacy only if they fulfil two methodological prerequisites whose legitimacy is 
                                                          
3 Some scholars claim that non-resident non-citizens – that is, non-members – should be entitled to political 
participation (Fine, 2011), whereas others say that decisions in democracy do not involve citizens who 
either disagreed or did not attend and must then be distinguished from majority rule (Rogers, 2008, p. 118). 
Such views, however, are to be regarded mostly as exceptions to the most common perception of 
participation in deliberative systems.
4 For instance, in ancient Greek politics, laws were generally made and issued by non-natives (Gagarin, 
2008, pp. 44-6). The legislating activity was regarded as the construction of the space in which public affairs 
were to be discussed. Laws functioned as a sort of wall built around a city, inside which political
participation would take place. The legislative activity was like the foundation of the political space; it was 
not the political space by itself. That is why it could be performed and issued by non-natives, who gained 
no right to participation afterwards. Hence, the legislative activity involved the rule of the majority without 
ever requiring individual membership.
5 One can easily think of a decision-making process in which a single individual member manifests a power 
– based on charisma or on violence, for instance – to determine the final decisions through whatever 
quantitative means he desires, including the rule of the majority or the rule of any given minority.
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somehow non-procedural. Both will constitute what can be termed the problem of 
prerequisites.
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE PREREQUISITE OF PROCEDURAL 
MEMBERSHIP
The first prerequisite emerges from the connection between the first and the 
second criteria (action and individual membership). Throughout the history of democratic 
theory, there has always been the implicit assumption that there is a disparity between the 
demos-ruler and the demos-ruled, inasmuch as democracy expresses a vision of politics 
presenting decision-making as a relationship between rulers and ruled. The quantification 
of individual members when what is at stake is the efficacy of political decisions always 
differs from the quantification of those individual members who are deemed capable 
enough to act when what is at stake is the political decision-making process. Simply put: 
the class of individual members who are the addressees of political rules is always 
different from the class of individual members who, besides being addressees of political 
rules, are also active in the sense that they are actual participants in some stage of the 
making of rules.
The history of constitutional experiences can be termed evolutionary from the 
viewpoint of quantifiable participation in government insofar as it unveils an increasing 
effort to narrow down the disparity between the two classes. When elections occur, for 
instance, there are at least three different classes of demos in play. The demos-addressee-
of-decisions, which includes all individual members of the community recognized by the 
decisional entity as being bound by its decisions; the demos-rightful-participant (also 
called ‘the electorate’), which includes all individual members of the community 
recognized as having the possibility to engage actively in the decision-making process of 
the decisional entity; and the demos-active-participant, which includes all individual 
members of the community who are recognized with the right to participate in the voting 
process and who actually exercise it. Typically, an evolutionary participatory democracy 
will tend to equate the first two classes; and the most effective participatory democracy 
will be the one in which all three classes coincide. Hence, the claim for voting rights to 
women and the struggles for civil rights to certain minorities have represented increasing 
attempts to equate the first two classes.
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In deliberative democracy, consensus-based procedures of decision making 
require that the members of the deliberative community are able to communicate 
effectively and offer reasons for their positions, are open to the reasoning of others and 
capable of investing time in the procedures. Quite often, however, these procedures 
require the need to produce decisions whose range of application extends beyond the 
deliberative community, in order to include members that, for one reason or another, 
provisionally fail to meet the necessary requirements for participating in discursive 
proceedings. In such cases, there is an ontological difference between the deliberative 
community and the entire political community that mirrors the difference between the 
demos-participant-in-decisions and the demos-addressee-of-decisions, much like what 
occurs in liberal and aggregative democracies.
The problem is that there is no possibility of ever fully equating the demos-
addressee-of-decisions with the demos-participant-in-decisions in any political decision-
making process, since the characteristics of membership to both classes are always 
determined differently. It is one thing to determine what it means to be an addressee of 
political decisions, something that can be done inside the actual deliberative procedure. 
The decision-making process will eventually include the determination of who is to be 
bound by the decisions in the making. But it is something else entirely to determine what 
it means to be a participant in decision making, since that cannot be determined by the 
actual process. Otherwise, only those who actually exercised the possibility of 
participating could be recognized as rightful participants, which would open room for 
active tyranny if only one individual member decided to show up. 
Moreover, participation includes active membership – the criterion of action and 
the criterion of individual membership combined – and action (or rather the possibility of 
political action) is not a necessary characteristic of those who are members of the demos-
addressee-of-decisions. In order to know who can become a political participant, there 
must be a determination of those who are equal from some particular point of view, 
namely, the possession of one same characteristic. This characteristic is essential in order 
to make a potential addressee of decisions into an active participant in decisions. If the 
possession of any characteristic whatever always makes it possible to group people in a 
category defined by the fact that its members possess the characteristic in question, then 
those having an essential characteristic in common will form part of one and the same 
essential category.
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However, it is never easy to find a single criterion determining which and how 
many of the potential addressees of government are sufficiently competent to decide who 
and how many addressees shall have the competence to participate in decision making.6
The characteristic that includes someone in the essential category of the demos-
participant-in-decisions always seems to be determined arbitrarily. Some tend to think 
that only the smartest men should meet such qualities; others will give preference to rich 
men and proprietors; others only to men; others only to women; others only to members 
of a specific race; others only to men and women with at least one masculine child; others 
only to people over 16 years of age; others only to people over 18 years of age; others 
only to people over 21 years of age; and others, still, to everybody who qualifies as 
human; etc. 
How does this affect pure proceduralism as a viable account of legitimacy? In 
order to know who can participate in the discursive deliberative procedure that will 
eventually determine those who are the decisions’ addressees, there must be a prior rule 
determining the substantive characteristics of those who are to be admitted into the 
participative process. This is especially important in epistemic accounts of deliberative 
democracy, since the epistemic requirements for being an addressee of decisions are not 
generally as strong as the epistemic requirements for being a participant in deliberation.  
The idea that there can be a total coincidence between both classes is always refuted by 
the very presentation of membership as individual action and communication. Ultimately, 
there will always be some boundaries to the ability of communicative intervention 
included in the determination of the essential category of the demos-participant-in-
government. Age is probably the most notorious of such boundaries. The determination 
of which age is more proper to turn a potential addressee of government into an actual 
participant in government cannot be made in a case-by-case basis, since that would imply 
actual participative decisions already in play (decisions that would necessarily be reached 
                                                          
6 This problem is usually known in the philosophical literature as ‘the problem of scope’ or ‘the democratic 
boundary problem’, which concerns the legitimate demarcation of the political units within which 
democracy will be practiced: How to decide who legitimately make up the group of individuals who are 
bound together as a people for the purpose of collective self-government (Song 2012)? One of the most 
celebrated ways of overcoming the problem is, for instance, the 'All Affected Interests Principle' (AAIP), 
which is non-procedural by definition, and according to which the justification of political authority is owed 
to all persons whose interests are affected by its exercise (Shapiro 1999; Young 2000; Goodin 2007). 
Another is the principle of coercion, according to which those subject to an institutional coercive power 
should have an equal say in how that power is exercised (López-Guerra 2005; Abizadeh 2008). One of the 
greatest challenges faced by deliberative democratic theory is the need to offer an account – in the line of 
the AAIP or of the principle of coercion – of why outsiders should confer legitimacy on the decisions 
reached inside the participative forum (Parkinson, 2005, p. 5).
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by excluding from their making process the one who is chosen as participant, thus turning 
that particular decision into a non-fully-participative one), and it cannot have a scientific 
precision. The choice between this age and that seems rather arbitrary, but it must be 
presupposed in order for participation to take place at all. 
The problem of prerequisites in this connection between the first two criteria lies 
in the fact that the essential category of active individual membership, which constitutes 
the very heart of deliberative participation, cannot be achieved by means of actual 
deliberative procedures. Rather, it depends upon a prior rule specifying certain 
characteristics that must be met in order to accept someone as a potential participant. Such 
a rule cannot emerge from the actual participative process, since then it would remain 
problematic who could participate in such a procedure, which would require another prior 
rule determining the participation requirements for the very first participative process, 
which in turn would require another rule of the same sort, and so on, to infinity. An infinite 
series of remissions never really determines unequivocally who can have access to 
participation; also, the circularity of the argument (procedural outcomes determine who 
can participate in the procedures in the first place) makes deliberative procedures utterly 
incapable of self-justification. 
The only way to overcome the perpetuity of remissive determinations and the 
circular argument is by setting a basic prior rule establishing the characteristics that must 
be met in order for someone to be admitted into the decision-making process. Such a rule
can only emerge from outside the actual participative moment and be set beforehand, that 
is, immune to pure proceduralism’s legitimacy tests. But the existence of such a rule 
constitutes a form of im/perfect proceduralism, in Rawls’ terminology.
That is why it must be imputed to some absolute that, even though it exists prior 
to the decision-making process, claims to express the demos-addressee-of-decisions to be 
found at the end of the decision-making process. The history of democratic theory has 
determined this absolute in many different ways – God, justice, the people, the constituent 
power, the Volksgeist, the founding fathers, the spirit of the constitution, the individual 
rights of man, the constituent assembly, the proletariat, the party, etc. –, but not one of 
those ways is democratically procedural as such. The ultimate groundwork of the 
legitimacy of deliberative procedures is hence non-procedural by nature. The problem of 
prerequisites reveals itself in the need for a non-democratically-procedural
methodological prerequisite for assessing fair procedures that function as legitimacy 
yardsticks. This is sufficient to imperil the reasoning of pure proceduralism. 
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THE ARGUMENT FROM THE PREREQUISITE OF PROCEDURAL RULING
There is another non-deliberative prerequisite of deliberation emerging from the 
connection between the second and the third criteria (individual membership and the 
quantitative decision rule). Deliberative decisions are reached by applying the 
quantitative decision rule in force within the procedure. Deliberation aims at achieving 
consensus by following and establishing reasons acceptable to all who are committed to 
the procedures; but when consensus (or something resembling it) is not possible, 
decisions can be reached by applying the rule of the majority to individual members.
Several problems arise from the use of majoritarian decisions whenever pressing 
matters require a swift decision that suspends the deliberative process provisionally. A 
substantive problem is how to find normative justification in majoritarian procedures, and 
how to protect minorities and individual differences against being overridden in such 
cases of majority rule. Or, rather, how to ensure that some rights are guaranteed in such 
a strong way that they may not be violated even my majorities (Christiano, 1990, p. 167). 
The most obvious answer ensures that rights of participation are always consensual to 
democratic proceedings. Consensus-based rights entail that they are protected against 
majoritarian violations as long as the deliberative community equates democracy to the 
absolute need for participation rights (with no possibility of contesting them). However, 
this makes it logically impossible to have violations of rights in democracy (if rights are 
violated, there is no democracy at all), and also to have individual participation rights in 
political regimes other than deliberative democracy. In addition, rights to equal 
participation are trapped inside a circular argument of justification, for they would be 
presupposed data (in the consensus-making procedure establishing the contents of 
participation rights) rather than the outcome of a procedure that in turn would have to 
presuppose them in order to legitimate them (Gould, 1996).
But the problem of consensus building and consensus-based majoritarian 
decisions does not present only a substantive challenge. It also presents a methodological 
problem in the development of deliberative procedures. Two methodological problems 
arise that endanger the viability of pure proceduralism.
Firstly, majoritarian decisions will always have to follow procedural rules that are 
necessarily consensual. Otherwise, the actual participative process cannot determine 
whether one measured quantity corresponds to a majority or not whenever consensus 
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cannot be reached with regard to the specific procedural rules in force. On the one hand, 
majorities presuppose that there will be, in a plurality of opinions, at least two that will 
coincide. But what if the process produces absolute dissension between members and 
each holds an entirely different and incompatible opinion when compared to others? On 
the other hand, when the decision-making process deals with absolute concerns that can 
be resolved through a yes-or-no answer and all participants exercise their yes-or-no stand, 
majorities can be easy to measure. But what happens when there is more than two 
alternatives to choose from, or even when some participants openly reject to choose from 
the set of yes-or-no alternatives in discussion? Should the majority be measured in such 
instances simply in a relative way? Does active participative abstention from a given set 
of alternatives imply a momentary suspension of individual membership for purposes of 
accounting for majorities?
These procedural problems cannot be solved by the actual procedure, since such 
solutions would be affected by the exact same (quantitative) accountability problems. So, 
typically, decision-making processes presuppose a certain unanimous way of measuring 
majorities in the moment of accounting for definitive decisions: they presuppose a 
consensual decision rule establishing the level of agreement necessary to finalize a 
decision. Some decisions will require unanimous consensus, others absolute majorities, 
others mere relative majorities, and others still strong majorities of individual members. 
Possible decision rules vary within the following range:
? Unanimous consensus:
o Unanimous agreement (all participants agree in accepting a certain 
decision as their first choice)
o Unanimous consent (all participants consent to accepting a certain 
decision, even if it does not express their direct and favourite personal 
view)
? Near-unanimous consensus:
o Unanimous agreement minus one (or minus a specific small number, 
like two or three)
o Unanimous consent minus one (or minus a specific small number, like 
two or three)
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? Super majority thresholds (90%, 80%, 75%, two-thirds, 60%, etc.)
? Simple Majority (50% plus 1)
? A specific committee decides
? A specific person decides
? Lottery decisions (all participants cast votes for their preferred options but, 
instead of these being counted, one is randomly selected and that vote 
determines the outcome) (Saunders, 2010)
The determination of a definitive threshold beyond which deliberation ends and a 
decision is reached requires a prior unanimous and consensual understanding about what 
specific quantity constitutes the deciding threshold for that specific decision-making 
process – a unanimous and consensual understanding that must be determined before the 
actual deliberative stage. Moreover, accounting for majorities presupposes the ability of 
knowing what to count, which means the process must already include beforehand the 
general recognition of active participative abstention with regard to measurements of 
decisive thresholds.
Secondly, decisions can be reached by measuring reason-giving attitudes in the 
class of individual members. But what constitutes individual membership for each and 
every given decision-making process? Democratic decisions arise from some form of 
quantitative measurement, such as majorities, for instance. But the majority of what? 
Deliberative democrats tend to accept the absolute equality between people who show up 
for deliberation with the required skills for communication. However, that presupposes a 
prior substantive (rather than merely procedural) decision about what constitutes a 
‘person who shows up for deliberation’ and about what specific skills and characteristics 
such a person must have in order to be recognized both as a person and as a participant. 
There always seems to be the need for a sort of prior theoretical consensus concerning 
the determination of the conceptual framework around which the processes of identifying 
and counting opinions can occur. Even if the system is as simple as ‘counting heads’, 
there is always the need to ascertain what counts as a head in that particular situation. 
Since the demos-participant can always be divided into several uneven parts, usually in 
order to facilitate the counting process, the rule of the majority can be applied to universal 
individual membership of the demos-participant in such a way that the majority of a given 
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set of different partial majorities might not correspond to the actual absolute majority of 
the demos-participant as a whole.7 Since partition can be presupposed by the process 
itself, there is always the need for a prior methodological determination of how the 
counting procedures can actually take place. And since such a determination will have 
the same problems of (quantitative) accountability, it will have to occur by means that are 
not intrinsically deliberative.
These problems represent a new argument in the problem of prerequisites. 
According to the methodological prerequisite of procedural ruling, the structure of 
deliberative proceedings depends on a convention (or a set of conventions) or on any 
other way of recognizing the methodological preferences for deliberation (including 
decision rules and categorical membership requirements) that members (whoever they 
might be) of the deliberative community share unanimously. But if members of the 
deliberative community share a way of recognizing their proceedings, how can they 
engage in the disputes about the very nature of those proceedings? How can people 
disagree about what procedures should be followed, if they share a unanimous 
conventional way of recognizing the proceedings? Pure proceduralism cannot explain the 
possibility of disagreement with regard to the very formal requirements of deliberative 
proceedings, since it bases its legitimacy claims on the supposition that deliberative 
members share uncontroversial criteria provided by the conventional meaning of 
procedural ruling for the legitimacy of deliberative decisions.8
Pure proceduralism sustains that deliberative proceedings can be meaningful and 
legitimate only if members share such criteria unanimously. This is troublesome to a 
theory of political legitimacy because it leads the theorist to think that people cannot have 
any deep disagreement about deliberative proceedings (Ceva 2012). They can only 
disagree about substantive questions that conform to the proceedings; or, with regard to 
the very structure of the proceedings, they can only disagree about empirical questions 
(such as what words were used to establish the quantitative decision rule), or about how 
penumbral cases involving the application of procedural rules should be resolved, or 
about whether the methodological prerequisites in force should be changed. Disagreeing 
                                                          
7 This is what happens, for instance, with the U.S. election for presidential office, for instance, in which the 
majority of the ‘popular vote’ does not necessarily coincide with the majority of votes in the U.S. Electoral 
College.
8 In this sense, pure proceduralism is subject to the same problems that Ronald Dworkin identifies in certain 
legal positivist conceptions of law under the general heading of the ‘semantic sting’ (Dworkin, 1986).
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about the criteria for application of the deliberative proceedings would entail self-
contradiction.
If methodological prerequisites must be set necessarily in accordance with a 
unanimous consensus, then disagreement about the formal requirements of certain 
deliberative proceedings are inescapably self-contradictory. According to pure 
proceduralism, theoretical disagreement about the grounds of procedures must be a 
pretence because the very meaning of the word ‘procedure’ makes any deliberative 
procedure depend on certain specific criteria, and any member who rejected or challenged 
those criteria would be speaking self-contradictory nonsense.  Any attempt to differ from 
those prerequisites entails a transgression of procedural rules – a violation of normative 
requirements (about quantitative decision rules or about membership) for deliberative 
procedures is self-contradictory since it implies the general acceptance of exceptions to 
unanimously pre-established rules.
The only way to justify disagreement without endangering the legitimacy of 
deliberative procedures would be to unanimously pre-establish the possibility of dissent 
within the ongoing procedures. But even such a possibility would fail to become a viable 
decision rule. Conscientious objection is a good example of this: it is a procedural 
institution allowing dissent and disobedience (a sort of licit transgression) not only about 
what decisions or policies are to be made in a fair procedure, but also about what 
constitutes a fair procedure for certain morally-charged political matters. However, even 
though the possibility of its existence can be unanimously agreed upon before deliberative 
proceedings, it can never function as a procedural rule but only as an exception to 
procedural rules, since methodological prerequisites cannot allow the possibility of each 
and every member to engage in conscientious objection simultaneously without 
endangering the viability of the deliberative proceedings. Thus, conscientious objection 
is never really procedural objection, not even when it purports to dissent about the
structure and limits of certain deliberative proceedings. It is rather the actualization of 
procedural agreement concerning substantive disagreement.
The problem of prerequisites does seem to be a gruesome fate for a pure 
proceduralist, because those who suffer from it have to say that no one really disagrees 
with anyone about the nature of methodological prerequisites for deliberative procedures. 
Whenever people think they disagree about how to identify procedures on any point, that 
fact in itself demonstrates that there is nothing to disagree about: there is no procedure on 
the point at issue, if the agreed ways of identifying procedures do not decide the point. 
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So, when an apparent disagreement arises about the nature of procedural prerequisites, 
pure proceduralists will tend to believe that there is no deliberative procedure on the point 
– they will think that at least one party to any dispute over the content of the 
methodological prerequisites is both legally inept and philosophically misguided, or is 
just a liar.
The problem of prerequisites poses the challenge to pure proceduralism of 
explaining disagreement about the nature and content of methodological prerequisites for 
deliberative procedures. Pure proceduralists might claim that such prerequisites need not 
be very complete; like other rules, they can be vague. But this is no answer: if the task of 
a methodological prerequisite for a fair deliberative procedure is to provide a way of 
identifying legitimate proceedings for the production of valid political decisions, the tests 
provided need to be complete and uncontroversial, or there is no shared way of identifying 
the procedures in the first place.
In the end, the impossibility of theoretical disagreement is precisely the opposite 
of what methodological rules for fair proceedings aim to achieve. The purpose of a fair 
deliberative system is to provide the possibility that every member may participate 
actively, freely and equally in political decision-making processes, even if it entails 
communicating an individual reason that conflicts with the reasons subscribed by every 
remaining member of the deliberative community. Once again, methodological 
prerequisites for deliberative procedures seem to be somewhat immune to the legitimacy 
claims of deliberative procedures.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
One of the main features of pure proceduralism in deliberative democracy implies 
that citizens consider procedures as the source of legitimacy, and prefer the causal history 
of legitimation for each law to be transparent and easily traceable to the deliberative 
process. The problem of procedural prerequisites lies in the fact that, inasmuch as 
discursive proceduralism is the main criterion of legitimacy, the legitimacy of discursive 
proceduralism as a source of subsequent legitimacy is grounded neither in discourse nor 
in deliberative procedures. On the one hand, the methodological prerequisite of 
procedural membership cannot be established by a procedure, since it will always have 
to trace the source of its legitimacy to a prior rule (immune to deliberation) conferring 
membership rights. Otherwise, the procedural deliberation establishing membership 
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criteria would have the same problem of identifying the rule conferring membership 
rights to such a deliberative procedure, which in turn would also have the same problem, 
and so on. On the other hand, the methodological prerequisite of procedural ruling cannot 
be established by a deliberative procedure, since it does not permit the possibility of 
theoretical disagreement about its nature and contents. Otherwise, the inexistence of 
unanimous consensus about decision rules, for instance, would require the application of 
a prior decision rule in order to explain the decision rules in force, which in turn would 
have the same problem, and so on. 
Notwithstanding, the problem of prerequisites is not by itself sufficient to 
undermine the viability of deliberative processes of decision making. What the problem 
does undermine in deliberative democracy is the viability of pure proceduralism as a 
theory of legitimacy, insofar as procedures are not the source of legitimacy per se, but 
rather the instruments for assessing and actualizing prior sources of legitimacy. If 
deliberative procedures were the source of legitimacy, they would have to be either self-
referential or immune to further legitimacy criteria. Since they are not, they seem more 
like channels of legitimacy rather than sources. Within such a frame of reference, pure 
proceduralist theories can be effective assessments of legitimacy claims in political 
decisions and laws; but they are insufficient to render the legitimacy of the very 
procedures. Hence the need to look again beyond the procedures to what lies behind them: 
that is the main philosophical challenge posed to consensus-oriented theses such as the 
ones sustaining deliberative systems of political participation.
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